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Acquired brain injury is considered to be one of the most important public health 
concerns in the United States, with approximately 1.2 million adults that meet the criteria 
for chronic brain disease, brain disorder, or injury each year. Medical costs directly 
related to injury, in addition to the indirect costs related to job loss, totaled an estimated 
60 billion dollars in the year 2000. Subsequent impairment following brain injmy yields a 
complicated neurobehavioral sequelae of deficits. Anosognosia, specifically, the deticit 
of the patient's inability to acknowledge, or even recognize impairments, is common 
following brain injury. In a review of the literature, this study examined the phenomenon 
of anosognosia, and its relationship to an individual's perception of control Both the 
Perception of Control Across Domains Scale (PCADS) and the Neurological Impairment 
Scale (NIS) were utilized as a measure of self-report, and compared with the patient's test 
scores on standardized neuropsychological measures. Findings concluded that patients do 
not reliably report their symptoms. Although the study's findings revealed no significant 
correlations, implications for the field of psychology are still useful. The rising costs of 
healthcare have contributed to the problem of insmance companies attempting to 
eliminate the coverage for nemopsychological testing, in favor of conducting a clinical 
interview. These findings suggest that clinicians cannot rely solely on patient report to 
determine an accurate diagnosis. 
Learning is finding out what you already know. 
Doing is demonstrating that you know it. 
Teaching is reminding others that they know just as well as you. 
You are all learners, doers, and teachers. 
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PERCEIVED CONTROL AND SELF AWARENESS 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Incidence and Prevalence of Adult-Onset Brain Impairment 
There are approximately 1.2 million individuals between the ages of 18 and older 
who meet the criteria for an adult onset of a chronic brain disease or brain disorder in the 
United States each year (FCA, 2001). The incidence of adults who currently live with 
impairments as a result of acquired brain disorders range from between 13.3 to 16.1 
million (FCA, 2001). Statistics compiled by the Family Caregiver Alliance (2001) 
reported high and low end estimates of the major causes of brain disorders in adulthood. 
These include, but are not limited to, Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (20,000 to 30,000); 
Epilepsy (1,984,000 to 2,000,000); HIV (AIDS) Dementia (14,537 to 58,150); 
Huntington's Disease (approximately 30,000); Multiple Sclerosis (250,000 to 350,000); 
Parkinson's Disease (500,000 to 1,500,000), and strokes (4,000,000 to 4,400,000). 
Many of the abovementioned diseases and subsequent brain impairments are 
progressive, and in some cases, the incidence and prevalence increase with age (CDC, 
2006b; FCA, 2001). It is estimated that 35.8% ofindividuals who are ages 84 or older 
experience moderate to severe memory impailment, and approximately 4,000,000 
individuals are diagnosed with probable Alzheimer's disease (FCA, 2001). Given the 
increasing longevity of our growing population, it is expected that the prevalence and 
incidence of brain disease and disorders will increase proportionately (FCA, 2001). By 
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the year 2020, it is predicted that, in the state of California alone, there will be 
approximately one million individuals over the age of 85 who will be diagnosed with 
brain-related impairment; this is twice as many as there are today (FCA, 2001). 
The body of literature addressing traumatic brain injury and its resultant acquired 
cognitive deficits continues to grow (FCA, 1998). The scope of occurrences which result 
in traumatic brain injuries is broad, and its resultant deficits are vast. Such occurrences 
include, but are not limited to, impacts related to falls, head trauma due to car accidents, 
penetration wounds such as gunshots, injury from surgical procedures, or oxygen 
deprivation (FCA, 1998). More recent statistics cited by the Center for Disease Control 
(2006b) reported that approximately 28% of brain injuries resulted from falls; 20% 
occurred from motor vehicle-traffic accidents; 19% resulted from strike or impact events 
and 11 % resulted from assaults. 
It has been stated that from 1.6 to 3.8 million individuals who sustain sports or 
recreational-related injuries will result in what is considered a mild traumatic brain 
injury, or concussion (FCA, 2001). In addition to trauma, the American Brain Tumor 
Association (2008) reports that more than 190,000 individuals are diagnosed with brain 
tumors each year. Approximately 44,000 are primary brain tumors; approximately 
150,000 are metastatic. Recent statistics reported prevalence rates of individuals living 
with primary brain tumors are estimated at approximately 359,000 (American Brain 
Tumor Association, 2008). 
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Statement of the Problem 
Acquired brain injury is considered to be an important public health concern 
because of its incidence rate, not to mention its significant impact on an individual's daily 
functioning (Vickery, Gontkovsky & Caroselli, 2005). During the year 2000, medical 
costs directly related to brain injuries, and the indirect costs related to loss of 
productivity, totaled an estimated 60 billion dollars in the United States (CDC, 2006b). 
The resultant cognitive impairment on insult to the brain produces significant 
long-term consequences (FCA, 2001). According to statistics from the Center for Disease 
Control (2006b), an estimated 62.3 per 100,000 individuals who sustained head injuries 
suffered enduring functional impairment (FCA, 1998); approximately 5.3 million 
individuals would then require lifelong assistance with daily living activities. There are 
an estimated 330,000 individuals who have sustained head injuries significant enough to 
require hospitalization, with approximately 99,000 injuries which resulted in long-term 
disability (FCA 1998). 
The subsequent impairment because of a brain insult contributes to a complicated 
array ofneurobehavioral deficits (Sherer et aI., 1998c; Sherer et aI., 2003). Patients may 
exhibit any combination and magnitude of medical, physical and cognitive deficits 
(Flashman et aI., 2005; Sherer, Oden, Bergloff, Levin & High, 1998) affecting the 
domains of language, thinking, learning, emotions, behaviors, and sensation (CDC, 
2006b). Approximately 40 percent of individuals who are hospitalized with brain injuries 
require remediation for memory improvement, problem solving, managing stress and 
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emotional regulation, including controlling one's temper, and improving job skills (CDC, 
2006b). 
Prigatano (1999) found that with each successive stage after brain injury, patients 
often exhibited a disturbance in consciousness which altered their perceptions of their 
changes in personality and cognition. In addition to personality difficulties such as 
irritability, restlessness, and depression, the literature reports the phenomenon of 
impaired self-awareness (Sherer et aI, 2003); this impairment in self-awareness is a 
common finding following brain injury (Shereer et al., 1998a). 
Purpose of the Study 
Because of the significant challenges facing rehabilitation specialists, the concept 
of unawareness has more recently experienced resurgence in the literature (Bogod, 2003; 
FIashman & McAllister, 2002; Martelli et al., 2000; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). The ability to 
identify whether or not the patient was able to evaluate accurately his or her level and 
severity of neurological functioning, and to self-appraise his or her perception of the 
ability to manage his or her environment following brain injury, may serve as a useful 
component both in clinical and in rehabilitative settings. 
Despite speculation and theory over the previous century, and given the 
heterogeneity of the concept, there still exists a poor understanding of impaired 
awareness (Vuilleumier, 2004). The need for a more comprehensive understanding of the 
underlying mechanism of self-awareness in contributing to poor self-perception 
following traumatic brain injury remains a critical topic for discussion (Prigatano, 1996). 
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The issue of the patient's lack of awareness of deficit across a wide variety of 
domains is one that is dealt with daily by practicing neuropsychologists (Bigler & 
Clement, 1997). The purpose of this study is to explore patients' subjective self-rep011s 
on two structured checklists, in order to determine whether or not there is a relationship 
between 1) the accurate patient report of level of severity of symptoms; and 2) the 
patient's ability to perceive control over his or her behaviors and environment, when 
compared with actual test scores as measured by standardized neuropsychological 
assessment 
The first checklist, (the Perceived Control Across Domains Scale [PCADSJ), is a 
self-repo11 measure of how well the patient perceives control over different domains in 
life following brain injury or following an acquired brain disease or disorder. The second 
checldist, (the Neuropsychological Impairment Scale [NIS]), allowed the patient to rate 
his or her subjective experience and severity of neuropsychological symptoms following 
brain injury or an acquired brain disease or disorder. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Defining the concept of impaired self-awareness 
Impaired self-awareness, also known commonly in the literature as anosognosia, 
is defined as the patient's partial or complete unawareness of an acquired deficit 
following neurological insult (Bogod, 2003; Borgaro & Prigatano, 2003; Carota, Staub & 
Bogousslavsky, 2002; Flashman, 2002; Flashman et aI., 2005; Hart, Giovannetti, 
Montgomery & Schwartz, 1998; Martelli, Pickett & Zaner, 2000; Sherer, et aI., 1998a). 
Up to 45 percent of individuals with moderate to severe brain injuries demonstrate either 
a reduced capacity for awareness, or a complete lack of awareness of their deficits 
(Flashman 2002). 
Stuss (1991) repOlied that patients with unawareness deficits have difficulty with 
understanding the implications oftheir own actions, demonstrate a reduced capacity to 
self-monitor, and exhibit dissociation between their behaviors and their thoughts. 
Although the phenomenon of impaired awareness has been reported in the medical 
literature for over a century (Cheng & Man, 2006), the concept has received relatively 
little focus compared with other manifestations of neuropsychiatric illnesses (Flashman, 
2002). 
Within the clinical domain, the manifestations of impaired self-awareness 
presents in various ways (Murphy, 2003). Patients seem unable to recognize the 
impairment, or to acknowledge that the impairment exists; they judge the deficit to be 
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inconsequential, or completely discount the existence of these deficits (Carota et al., 
2002; Flashman et al., 2005), despite observable evidence to the contrary by others such 
as family members and therapists (Flashman et al., 2005). 
Although studies have demonstrated the fact that patients have inaccurately 
evaluated their sensory, perceptual, motor, affective and cognitive abilities following 
brain injury (Orfei et al., 2007; Vuilleumier, 2004), the report of unawareness is further 
complicated by the inconsistency across all types of impairments, and varies in degree 
depending upon the severity of the neurological insult. During the acute period of brain 
injury, some patients were completely unaware that they had sustained any injury at all 
(Sherer et al., 199 8b), yet other patients reported themselves to be completely normal 
with regard to their higher cognitive functioning and physical status (Flashman et al., 
2005; Prigatano & Altman, 1990). 
Other studies have found that some patients were able to report only vague 
behavioral symptoms, and were unable to appreciate the connection between these 
impairments and their brain injuries (Prigatano, 2005). Other patients reported differences 
in themselves, but maintained that they were not readily identifiable (Prigatano & 
Altman, 1990). Left untreated over time, deficits in unawareness result in a culmination 
of financial difficulties, decreased self-esteem, and social isolation (Murphy, 2003). 
Complications in achieving unified terminology 
In addition to being a complicated phenomenon, at this time no straightforward 
and unitary definition of this concept has been proposed (Cheng & Man, 2006; Flashman 
PERCEIVED CONTROL AND SELF-AWARENESS 8 
et ai., 2005). The language used to define the absence of awareness further complicates 
an already intricate and complex explanation of the problem. Specifically, telminology 
has been frequently interchanged in the scientific literature to communicate different 
facets of this phenomenon (Flashman et ai. 2005). Research studies have reported such 
terms interchangeably as anosognosia, agnosia, unawareness and denial (Flashman, 2002; 
Flashman, et ai., 2005; Vuilleumier, 2004), lack of insight, and anosodiaphoria 
(Flashman et aI, 2005). These terms have suggested various meanings, and seem to be 
dependent upon the context of the study, or the interpretation by the authors (Flashman, 
2002; Flashman, et ai., 2005; Vuilleumier, 2004). 
Some studies have attempted to define and differentiate the terminology 
operationally. Studies by Agnew & Morris (1998) suggested that the lack of insight or 
awareness were used synonymously and reflected a change in metacognitive functioning. 
Some research studies have distinguished between denial and anosognosia specifically 
for motor impairment, and have reported different forms of unawareness, as well as 
different underpinnings for the impairment (Dalla Barba et ai., 1999). Studies by 
Anderson and Tranel (1989) found that the patient's unawareness of cognitive deficits did 
not coincide with unawareness of motor impairments. It was reported that many patients 
without motor deficits demonstrated a striking unawareness only of cognitive impairment 
(Anderson & Tranel, 1989). 
Prigatano (2005) defined the concept of impaired self-awareness and anosognosia 
interchangeably as "the clinical phenomena in which a brain dysfunctional patient does 
not appear to be aware of impaired neurological or neuropsychological function, which is 
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obvious to the clinician and other reasonably attentive individuals" (Prigatano, 2005, p. 
20). 
Other research has attempted to define how unawareness is viewed as a symptom, 
and separately from a biological perspective. Research by Orfei and colleagues (2007) 
defined the concept of anosognosia as being more closely related to neurological brain 
lesions. In their research on stroke patients, the authors have narrowed the fields to such 
key areas of stroke, anosognosia, awareness, denial, unawareness, and hemiplegia, along 
with corresponding neurological and neuropsychological data and clinical trial outcome. 
The study indicated that the concept of unawareness and its multifaceted behavioral 
manifestations yield a complex phenomenon that contributes to the uncertainty of 
conceptual definitions and diagnoses (Orfei et al., 2007). 
The term anosognosia, which literally translates as "lack of knowledge of disease" 
(p. 309) was previously introduced by Babinski in 1914 (Agnew & Morris, 1998; 
Markova & Berrios, 2000; Prigatano & Weinstein, 1996; Orfei et al., 2007; Vuilleumier, 
2004). Babinski's studies reported on two patients with left hemiplegia following injury 
to the non-dominant hemisphere (Dalla Barba, Bartolomeo, Ergis, Boisse & Bachoud-
Levi, 199; Hart et al. 1998). Such examples include patients who have hemiplegia but 
believe their paralyzed limbs still function normally (Clare, 2003); one was unaware of 
her paralysis for several years (Prigatano & Weinstein, 1996). 
In the late nineteenth century, studies by Anton found evidence that patients were 
oblivious to major neurological impairments, seemingly unaware or denying the 
disability despite evidence to the contrary (Markova & Berrios, 2000). These reports 
specifically addressed unawareness of cortical blindness (Anton's syndrome) and 
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deafness (Agnew & Morris, 1998; Markova & Berrios, 2000; Prigatano & Weinstein, 
1996; Vuilleumier, 2000; Vuilleumier, 2004). 
Flashman et aI. (2005) described Anton's Syndrome as one of the most 
remarkable representations of impaired awareness. Patients who sustained damage to the 
occipital cortex or optic radiations involving the primary visual or visual association 
cortex suffered with cortical blindness as a result. The destruction of the ability to process 
visually resulted in an unobstructed display of visual imagery, but was misinterpreted by 
the patient as the inability to see. This may also have contributed to the patients' 
confabulated responses often found documented in the literature (Flashman et aI., 2005). 
Wernike described patients with aphasia who were unaware of their language 
deficits (Agnew & Monis, 1998; Flashman et aI., 2005). More recent literature has 
demonstrated the fact that anosognosia has been reported to accompany what has been 
described as jargon aphasias, which includes Wernicke's aphasia, transcorticcal sensory 
aphasia and global aphasia (Flashman et aI., 2005). 
These aphasias, characterized by long, ongoing sentences, meaningless sounds, 
phonemic or semantic paraphasias and neologisms, appeared to go unrealized by the 
patient (Flashman et aI., 2005). Consistent with previous reports, studies by Clare (2002) 
reported patients who demonstrated unawareness deficits for fluent aphasia produced 
numerous paraphasias and neologisms. 
Based upon observable behaviors, patients seemed completely oblivious to what 
was being said to them, and were unaware that the listeners did not comprehend what the 
patients were trying to express (Flashman et aI., 2005). Studies reported that although 
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these patients believed that they were communicating effectively, they became frustrated 
when they were not understood by the examiner (Clare, 2002). 
In the late 1800' s, Korsakoff noted the lack of concern for amnesia (Agnew & 
Morris, 1998). Westphal repOlied on a patient with hemianopia and hemiparesis who was 
not aware of his deficits. Sudden hemianopia and hemiplegia are most commonly 
associated with a vascular origin, often following a stroke, commonly occurring within 
the nondominant hemisphere (Flashman et al., 2005). From a functional perspective, 
despite the patients' inability to move or utilize the contralateral limbs (often the arm), or 
acknowledge stimuli in the contralateral hemifield, the patients stated that they were 
unimpaired (Flashman et aI., 2005). 
More recent studies have repeatedly demonstrated the fact that stroke patients 
diagnosed with anosognosia for hemiparesis denied the paresis, or acted as though the 
disorder did not exist (Baier, 2004). Patients tended to behave as though the limbs 
functioned normally, or they addressed the situation as though the limbs were simply 
tired (Baier, 2004). 
Studies by Carota and his colleagues (2002) reported that patients with 
anosognosia for a hemiparesis did not spontaneously complain about their deficits. Other 
patients acknowledged weakness in only one limb, although there was a complete-side 
hemiplegia. Patient complaints were found to be either congruent, when they walked or 
performed activities, or incongruent, when only hesitantly accepting a wheelchair or bed 
(Carota et al., 2002). 
In a study of patients who sustained a stroke, Hartman-Maeir, Soroker, Ring and 
Katz (2002) reported that thirty percent of the entire sample did not spontaneously 
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acknowledge having had a stroke following a general inquiry about the reasons for 
hospitalization. When queried, a small percentage reportedly denied having had a stroke. 
Not limited to traumatic brain injury 
Much of the literature describing anosognosia has focused on patients who have 
sustained moderate to severe injuries to the central nervous system (Flashman et al., 
2005); Sherer et al., 1993). Although research has focused predominantly on groups with 
severe traumatic brain injury, little has been reported on other severity groups or in the 
non-traumatic brain injured population (Leathem, Murphy, & Flett, 1998). 
Studies by Sawchyn, Mateer and Suffield (2005) reported that in the majority of 
the literature, patients have been sampled from inpatient or outpatient rehabilitation 
programs or settings, which included predominantly those who had experienced moderate 
to severe brain injury. Other studies have expanded the conceptual definition of 
unawareness to include physical disabilities, traumatic events, abnormality in mood, 
disruptions in social interactions (Prigatano & Weinstein, 1996), and neurological 
disorders (Flashman et al., 2005). 
Research has also demonstrated the fact that deficits in awareness affect cognitive 
and behavioral domains more than they affect physical problems or functional activities, 
such as the patient's activities of daily living (Hart et al., 2004). A study by Sherer and 
his colleagues (1998b) found that some patients acknowledged deficits; however, many 
failed to understand the likely impact of these deficits on their daily activities. 
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Studies by Prigatao et al. (1990) found, that despite their lack of awareness for emotional 
and cognitive deficits, patients accurately appraised the areas of physical activity and 
basic self-care activities. 
Research by Sherer and colleagues (2000) suggested that impaired awareness may 
be related to the patient's overall cognitive and emotional functioning. Patients who were 
unaware of changes following brain injury experienced significant depression (Sherer, et 
al., 1998b). Gasquoine (1992) reported that emotional dysphoria (defined in the study as 
anxiety, depression, and hostility) was significantly and positively correlated with the 
patient's unawareness of sensory and cognitive changes following head injury. Positive 
affect was significantly and negatively correlated with the patient's awareness of sensory 
and cognitive changes. 
Studies by Prigatano, Altman and O'Brien (1990) found that individuals with 
traumatic brain injury had difficulty with emotional dyscontrol, cognitive ability, and 
social interaction. More recent studies have repOlied that patients with deficits in 
awareness exhibited poor self-appraisals in areas affecting their capacities for sound 
judgment, cognitive ability, interpersonal skills and social behavior (Flashman et al., 
2005). 
Findings suggested that neurological disorders including strokes, tumors, and 
progressive dementi as also resulted in physical, cognitive and behavioral decline, post-
insult (Sherer, et al., 1998c), and often rendered the patient unable to notice or 
acknowledge the existence of their impairments (Vuilleumier, 2004). In SPECT Studies 
by Venneri and Shanks (2003), findings identified marked hypoperfusion in the right 
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parietotemporal cortex in a patient with persistent anosognosia for hemiplegia following 
a stroke. 
In a comprehensive review from 1990 through 2007, Orfei and her colleagues 
reported that studies on impaired self-awareness have been focused primarily on stroke 
hemiplegic patients. Studies by Bogod, Mateer and MacDonald (2003) found the 
phenomenon of unawareness to be present in a number of behavioral syndromes 
following brain injury. 
In a study by Wagner, Spangenberg, Bachman and O'Connell (1997) the authors 
found that the Alzheimer patient group demonstrated significantly greater unawareness of 
cognitive deficits than did the two control groups. Their results concluded that 
independent of dementia severity, unawareness of cognitive ability is disease-specific. 
Studies by Clare on early-stage Alzheimer's patients (2002) found that although 
some symptoms of unawareness could be accounted for by neurological damage, 
apparent unawareness was viewed as the product of psychosocial processes and their 
interactions with cognitive impairments. 
Flashman (2002) reported that impaired awareness in Alzheimer patients ranged 
from the patient's acknowledging impaired memory but minimizing its severity, to the 
inaccurate report of very good memory skills. In a comprehensive study by Barrett, 
Eslinger, Ballentine and Heilman (2005), the authors concluded that patients with 
Alzheimer's disease estimated memory, attention, behavior, naming, visuospatial skill, 
limb praxis, mood and uncorrected vision before and after their abilities were assessed. 
Compared with controls, the patients with Alzheimer's disease demonstrated 
unawareness of their deficits, including overestimating visuospatial skills during 
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pretesting, and overestimating their memory abilities during the posttest (Barrett et a1., 
2005). 
Studies by Selzer, Vaster line, Mathias and Brennen (2001) reported that patients 
with Alzheimer's disease and patients with Parkinson's disease rated themselves as being 
less compromised than did their caregivers. The two groups differed significantly on 
awareness discrepancy measures from a cognitive perspective. In the ratings of patient 
cognitive skills, caregivers rated Alzheimer's patients significantly more impaired than 
the patients were able to recognize; however, caregivers and Parkinson's patients did not 
significantly differ on these ratings. The authors concluded that both groups of patients 
displayed impaired awareness on motor-related neurologic function. Parkinson's disease 
patients displayed relatively preserved awareness of motor and other deficits. Impaired 
awareness in patients with Parkinson's was associated with poorer overall cognitive 
function and with performance on memory, attention, and constructional ability, than 
were the Alzheimer's patients. 
Studies found that patients who suffered from Parkinson's disease exhibited 
poorer overall cognitive ability and lower performance on assessment measures of 
memory, attention and constructional ability; this was reported to be inconsistent with the 
patient's self-report of symptoms (Flashman, 2002). 
Leritz and her colleagues (2004) investigated whether or not patients with 
Parkinson's disease exhibited the features of anosognosia. Findings indicated that 
patients rated themselves as significantly less impaired on two measures of activities of 
daily living, indicating that disruption of the basil ganglia may alter patient insight into 
the severity of illness (Leritz et a1., 2004). 
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Studies by Goverover, Chiaravalloti and DeLuca (2005) reported a significant, 
positive correlation between cognitive abilities and self- awareness in executive 
dysfunction and disinhibition in patients with multiple sclerosis. However, affective 
symptoms of depression, and anxiety were negatively correlated with self-awareness of 
executive dysfunction. 
Sherman, Rapport and Ryan (2008) investigated patients with Multiple Sclerosis 
and evaluated subjective report of awareness deficits against objective test scores on 
cognitive abilities. Findings concluded that one-third of patients exhibited diminished 
awareness of cognitive and functional deficits. Their study suggested that unawareness of 
deficits was more commonly found among patients with secondary progressive Multiple 
Sclerosis than among those with relapse-remitting Multiple Sclerosis (Sherman et aI., 
2008). 
Studies on awareness deficits on patients with Huntington's disease exhibited 
denial of impairment, with unawareness of motor, cognitive and emotional changes 
(Goverover et aI, 2005). 
Deficits in awareness have also been identified in individuals with chronic 
alcoholism, schizophrenia, affective disorders and stress, as well as in medical disorders 
including breast cancer, heart disease and HIV and AIDS (Flashman, 2002). Studies by 
McEvoy, Freter, Merritt, and Apperson (1993) examined the correlation between frontal 
lobe and right hemispheric dysfunction and impaired awareness in patients with 
schizophrenia; however, the attempt to correlate neurological and psychiatric models of 
impaired awareness remains unclear (Markova & Berrios, 2000) 
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Clinical Models of Explanation 
At this time, no one study has been able to provide a comprehensive model of the 
psychological processes that underlie the expression of unawareness of deficits (Clare, 
2003) However, several models to explain impaired self-awareness have been proposed. 
According to Cheng and Man (2006) most clinical models share three common 
components. First, there is a description of the patient's lack of objective knowledge. 
Second, it is difficult for patients to apply objective information or knowledge about their 
own impairments to daily life. Third, neuropsychological abilities such as goal setting, 
self-performance prediction, and self-monitoring of psychological factors influence 
impaired self-awareness. 
Studies by Giancino and Cicerone (1998) reported a model composed of three 
sources of self-awareness. These included: 1) the limitation of cognitive impairment, 
specifically related to deficits in memory and reasoning; 2) the limitation of the 
psychological response or reaction to the impairment; and 3) the limitation of the 
inability to recognize the area of impairment. 
Crosson et al. (1989) proposed a three-tier model, identifying three distinct types 
of self-awareness, including intellectual awareness (described as the ability of the patient 
to comprehend that a particular function is impaired), emergent awareness (the ability of 
the patient to recognize that there is a functional problem as it occurs), and anticipatory 
awareness (the patient's ability to anticipate the problem that will occur as a result ofthe 
deficit). 
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Studies by Allen and Ruff (1990) created a comprehensive, three-level clinical 
model of self-awareness. The first level required the patient to attend to, to be able to 
encode information, and to retrieve information concerning the self. The second level 
required the patient to be able to compare existing information with premorbid, self-
evaluative information. The third level required the patient to be able to describe self-
perception to another individual. 
Fleming, Strong and Ashton (1996) proposed a comprehensive, three-level model 
of awareness, comprising awareness of objective knowledge, of functional implications 
and ways in which these impairments related to the patient's daily activities, and the 
patient's ability to establish realistic goals. 
In more recent studies by Toglia and Kirk (2000), the authors expanded upon 
Crosson's hierarchal model. According to this later model, awareness was divided into 
two major areas: metacognition, and what the authors described as online awareness 
(Toglia & Kirk, 2000). The authors described metacognitive knowledge as declarative 
knowledge concerning one's abilities. Online awareness was described as the ability to 
demonstrate ongoing monitoring of an individual's actual performance during the task 
(Dirette, 2002; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). 
Underlying Neuronal Mechanisms 
Currently, knowledge of the possible mechanisms underlying deficits in 
unawareness is still very poor (Dalla Barba et aI., 1999). The neuronal pathways of 
anosognosia are still debated (Orfei et aI., 2007), and few systematic studies have been 
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accomplished because the focus of these more effectively characterizes the clinical 
features of unawareness and its underlying cognitive mechanisms (Vuilleumier, 2004). 
More recent studies have been descriptive in addressing various lesion types and severity 
of neurological impairments, whereas studies focusing on experimental design have been 
limited or accomplished in only a few single cases (Vuilleumier, 2000). 
Earlier studies by McGlynn and Schacter (1989) concluded that anosognosia 
resulted from concurrent lesions within several areas of the brain, thereby creating 
varying degrees and combinations of producing different presentations of the disorder 
(Agnew & Morris, 1998). 
Research by Anderson and Tranel (1989) found that unawareness of hemiparesis 
was found only in subjects with right-hemisphere damage, suggesting that knowledge 
associated with right hemisphere neuronal networks (predominantly the primary and 
early association cortices where sensory and motor processes occur) necessary for the 
perception of an impaired function, was disrupted. 
In the most recent comprehensive evaluation of hemispheric specialization, 
findings concluded that the right cerebral hemisphere is dominant for the awareness both 
of physical and of emotional self (Devinsky, 2008). Body image, relationship to the 
environment, and social function are mediated by neuronal pathways associated with 
right hemisphere involvement (Devinsky, 2008). 
Consistent with research, studies found that patients who sustained lesions to the 
right hemisphere resulted in left-sided neglect, and anosodiaphoria (emotional 
indifference). In this case, motor problems were acknowledged, but without concern 
(Ossola, Ladavas, Stracciari, Giannarelli & Ossola, 1993). In studies by Devinsky (2008), 
PERCEIVED CONTROL AND SELF-AWARENESS 20 
Lesions to the right hemisphere were also associated with topographical disorientation, 
social disorders, and anosognosia. 
Although deficits in unawareness have often been associated with neurological 
disorder involving cOliical brain regions, relatively few studies have examined the role of 
subcortical structures (Leritz, Loftis, Crucian, Friedman & Bowers, 2004). Because 
subcortical structures (such as the thalamus, caudate nucleus and internal capsule) are 
connected extensively to larger cortical regions including the frontal lobes, one can 
expect that deficits in awareness would be similar to patients with cOliicallesions (Leritz 
et aI., 2004). 
The most recent neuropsychological models also suggested that problems with the 
feed-forward system and neuro-anatomical research consistently report right cerebral 
hemisphere (specifically, the prefrontal and parieto-temporal cortex, insula and thalamus) 
involvement (Orfei et aI., 2007). 
Studies by Andelman and colleagues (2004) found that patients with intractable 
epilepsy experienced significant distortions in their awareness of memory. Findings 
suggested that patients with epileptogenic right-hemisphere brain lesions overestimated 
their memory abilities, but patients with left-hemisphere lesions more equally 
overestimated and underestimated their abilities, similar to normal control subjects 
(Andelman et aI., 2004). 
Damage to the overarching control system mediated by the frontal lobes would 
result in a generalized disturbance of awareness for cognitive disorders (Agnew & 
Morris, 1998; Ossola et aI., 1993). This is consistent with earlier theories of anosognosia 
which postulated that the disorder was due to impairment within the central monitoring 
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systems, or to damage to the system governing conscious awareness (McGlynn & 
Schacter, 1989). 
Stuss, Picton, and Alexander (2002) proposed a theory of consciousness 
encompassing four distinct theories, summarized as: 1) awareness occurs as a result of 
cerebral processes that create models of the world; 2) the brain's ability to create these 
models are arranged in a hierarchal fashion; 3) within anyone division of this hierarchy, 
the processes operate in a modular fashion, and 4) At the highest level of conscious 
processing, the frontal lobes are significant in the role of conscious processing. 
Specifically, the right frontal lobe is critical for an individual to be self-aware (Stuss et aI, 
2002). 
In a study by Johnson et al. (2002) utilizing functional imaging, the authors 
concluded that the medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate were identified as 
important structures for accessing a sense of self, and were consistent with previous brain 
lesion studies in patients diagnosed with impaired self-awareness. 
McGlynn and Schacter (1989) reported that patients with amnesic disorders due 
to frontal lobe impairment tended to be unaware of their memory deficits; this is in 
comparison with patients whose amnesic disorders were due to temporal lobe damage. 
Markova and Berrios (2000) reported that many studies investigating these 
associations with frontal lobe involvement have not measured awareness in a systematic 
way and that findings concluded either a presence of or an absence of the disorder. 
Because many of these studies are single-case designs, from an empirical standpoint, it is 
difficult to generalize the fmdings conceming the relationship between unawareness and 
frontal lobe deficits (Markova & Berrios, 2000). 
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Studies have demonstrated that damage to the parietal lobes would result in 
impairment to the brain's center responsible for monitoring more peripheral difficulties, 
such as motor and sensory impairment (Ossola et aL, 1993). 
Studies by Andersson, Gundersent and Finset (1999) reported reduced se1f-
awareness to be associated with low autonomic reactivity. Their results concluded that 
reduced psychophysiological reactivity in patients who present as apathetic were 
associated with a decrease in emotional response, disengagement, and lack of concern for 
their current situation (Andersson, et al., 1999). 
Measuring Impaired Awareness 
The concept of impaired self-awareness remains a complicated and intricate 
phenomenon, and research on the nature and course of impairment following traumatic 
brain injury is still at an early stage (Sherer, et al., 1998b). Disturbances of self-awareness 
following neuropsychological insult are difficult to measure (Prigatano & Klonoff, 1998). 
The need for the accurate assessment of impaired awareness plays a critical role 
in contributing to patients' overall independent functioning (Bogod et al., 2003; 
Prigatano, 1999; Sherer, et al., 1998a; Sherer, Madison & Hammay, 2000; Toglia & Kirk, 
2000), the need for continued health care, the patient's ability to live independently, and 
whether or not the patient will be able to return to work or to former activities (Sherer et 
al., 2000). Correct identification also assists in the development of a treatment or 
remediation plan to address the patient's need for supervision, medical care, 
rehabilitation, and related costs (Sherer et al., 2000). 
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Findings by Sherer and colleagues (1998b) suggested that impaired awareness 
was not a global deficit, and was related not only to the severity of impairment, but also 
related to the measure utilized to make the diagnosis. Not only was this due to the scope 
of what was included within the concept of awareness (Toglia & Kirk, 2000), but also 
may conceivably be the result ofthe variety of ways in which the construct of awareness 
has been defined across studies (Sherer, et al., 1998b; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). 
There is a shortage of specific instruments and interventions to improve deficits in 
unawareness (Appelros, Karlsson, Seiger & Nydevik, 2002). Although a number of 
strategies have been implemented to obtain a quantitative evaluation, there is no single 
method to measure impaired awareness (Appelros et aL, 2002; Flashman & McAllister, 
2002; Fleming, Strong & Ashton, 1996), and no gold standard for what it is that 
constitutes this phenomenon (Bogod et aL, 2003). 
The use of self-report questionnaires, one method of gathering quantitative 
information, is scored by the interviewer, and compared with a rating scale (Flashman & 
McAllister, 2002). In order to make inferences concerning impaired self-awareness, the 
patient's report must differ from another external measure, such as performance on 
neuropsychological assessment measures (Anderson & Tranel, 1989), The general 
assumption is that patients who exhibit impairment in self awareness will rate their 
abilities as better than the standard; the discrepancy between the self-perception of 
abilities and actual scores is said to be the measure of the level of unawareness (Bali et 
al., 2004; Sherer, et al., 1998b). 
Self-report questionnaires are often used to gather both quantitative and 
qualitative information about patients' self-perceptions of their abilities (Bali et al., 
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2004). Over the years, research has focused on the patient's self-report with the intent to 
study its effect on rehabilitation outcome, and to assess the efficacy of treatment 
modalities which focus on improving awareness (Sherer, et al., 1998a, 1998b). 
The Patient-Competency Rating Scale (PCRS) is a measure that provides self-and 
informant-ratings of every day memory and gives an overview of the patient's awareness 
of their difficulties (Leathem, Murphy & Flett, 1998). In a study utilizing two measures 
of awareness, (clinician rating versus PCRS), Fischer, Trexler and Gauggel (2004) 
confirmed the fact that brain injured patients tended to overestimate their abilities when 
these patients are compared with orthopedic controls. Borgaro and Prigatano (2003) 
modified the rating scale for neurobehavioral rehabilitation (PCRS-NR) and found that 
the psychometric properties of this briefer version of the rating scale were found to be 
psychometrically sound for the use in an acute neurorehabilitation unit. 
In a study by Leathem et al. (1998), the traumatic, brain injured patients overrated 
their pre-accident competencies when they were compared with normal controls. Patients 
with moderate and mild brain injuries were consistent in their reports on cognitive and 
emotional domains. 
The findings, in study by Duke and his colleagues (2002), concluded that 
Alzheimer's patients tended to estimate their own memory abilities to be as good as that 
of the controls, over predicting their self-performance. Additionally, patients inaccurately 
underestimated their difficulties in carrying out daily functioning tasks, in comparison 
with caregiver reports (Duke & Seltzer, 2002). Although Alzheimer's patients 
demonstrated intact, immediate awareness of their memory difficulties, they failed to 
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incorporate incidents of memory failure into a generalized self-belief system (Duke & 
Seltzer, 2002). 
In a study utilizing the Self-Awareness of Deficits Interview (SADI), Simmond 
and Fleming (2003) investigated the reliability of the measure. Their results indicated 
high inter-rater reliability for the SADI, and reported that the measure is a reliable means 
of evaluating the level of self-awareness. 
Few cross-cultural studies have been reported in the literature. In a cross-cultural 
study comparing New Zealand Maoris and non-Maoris brain injured patients, Prigatano 
and Leathem (1993) compared patients' scores, utilizing the PCRS. Their research 
indicated that both groups showed no correlation between actual neuropsychological 
status and their self-report of behavioral competency. In contrast, the ratings of their 
relatives concerning their behavioral competency were correlated with the patients' 
neuropsychological test performance. 
The authors concluded that Maori patients reported less behavioral competency 
than non-Maori patients; non-Maori patients' performances on the PCRS replicated 
findings which were compared with American brain-injured patients. Their research 
concluded that brain damage contributes to patients' misperceptions of their own 
behavioral abilities; however, cultural factors also played a critical role (Prigatano & 
Leathem, 1993). 
Although questionnaires and structured interviews have been most frequently 
utilized, some limitations concerning these instruments have been repOlied in the 
literature. The use both of questiom1aires and of structured interviews relies heavily on 
the patient's ability to understand oral and written questions verbally, and to convey their 
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understanding of their deficits verbally (Flashman & McAllister, 2002). A study by 
Appelros and his colleagues (2002) indicated that self-report instruments cannot be 
effectively utilized when a patient's level of consciousness is reduced; this may have 
added a degree of uncertainty to the findings of their study. 
Comparisons of self-appraisal may be measured against that of a family 
member's, a clinician's, or a rehabilitative staffs rating (Flashman & McAllister, 2002; 
Sherer, et al., 1998a, 1998b; Toglia & Kirk, 2000), although it can invite caregiver and 
relative biases that may influence the patient (Fleming et al., 1996; Hart et al., 2004). 
However, when ratings are obtained by clinical and rehabilitative staff, the patient's 
premorbid information prior to the brain injury may not be available to the raters, thereby 
confounding a complete and accurate assessment (Flashman & McAllister, 2002). 
Studies by Bair and Karnath (2005) investigated whether or not patients 
mentioned their impairments spontaneously rather than when prompted. Their study 
concluded that individuals who did not mention their paresis spontaneously, but 
acknowledged the deficits when questioned directly, should not be diagnosed as having 
anosognosia. In a case study by Berti et at. (1998), the authors found that the patient 
demonstrated severe agnosia for motor impairment when reporting symptoms; however, 
only implicit knowledge of her condition was demonstrated. A contrast was noted 
between being unaware on a verbal report when compared with awareness on self-
evaluation tests (Berti et al., 1998). 
The most common way to measure a patient's awareness level is through 
comparison of the individual's self-appraisal against the individual's scores on another 
standardized or objective measure (Flashrnan & McAllister, 2002; Fleming et al., 1996) 
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such as the use of a self-report measure in comparison with a patient's performance on 
neuropsychological tests, or other performance measures (Flashman & McAllister, 2002; 
Toglia & Kirk, 2000). 
The challenge for rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation professionals agree that deficits in awareness continue to present 
major challenges so that a successful treatment outcome may be achieved (Flashman et 
aI., 2005; Sherer et aI., 2000; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). The role of physical rehabilitation 
has been the predominant form of rehabilitation following brain injury, and it has been 
only in the past two decades that psychologists, rehabilitation specialists, and 
neuropsychologists refocused their efforts on psychosocial and cognitive rehabilitation 
(Cheng & Man, 20(6). 
Within the domain of cognitive rehabilitation, research efforts have 
predominantly concentrated on the rehabilitation of cognitive abilities including memory, 
attention, orientation, comprehension, problem-solving and perception deficits. Other 
studies have found that rehabilitative programs were typically designed and implemented 
based on physical and neuropsychological assessment; however, they often neglected an 
assessment of the patient's motivational state (Andersson et aI., 1999). 
Although there are some research studies that have reported on the benefits of 
improving the patient's self-awareness, there is presently no consensus on models to 
guide intervention, or identification about which interventions are the most effective 
(Lucas & Fleming, 2005). It is imperative for brain injury rehabilitation specialists to 
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comprehend this phenomenon and to implement appropriate treatment approaches which 
may conceivably improve patient self-awareness (Sherer et al., 1998c). Establishing the 
framework for self-awareness in rehabilitation has been developed gradually, but it 
remains in its infancy (Cheng & Man, 2006). 
Additionally, because many patients who sustain brain injury are partially or fully 
unaware of this impairment, the treatment and rehabilitation is often hindered by this very 
deficit (Anderson & Tranel 1989). Although patients who demonstrated deficits in 
awareness exhibited a sense of self-regard of their own abilities and traits, they were not 
congruent with what others observed (Stuss, 1991). Sherer and his colleagues (l998b) 
found that although patients acknowledged deficits, many failed to understand the likely 
impact of these deficits on their daily activities. 
Studies have found that not only does the conect identification of deficits in 
awareness have important implications for rehabilitative outcome (Bogod et. al., 2003; 
Flashman, 2002; Sherer et al., 1998b; Toglia & Kirk, 2000), the ability to identify these 
impairments accurately is implicated in diagnostic treatment, and independent 
functioning (Flashman, 2002; Sherer, Bergloff, Boake, High & Levin, 1998b; Orfei et al., 
2007; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Studies by Prigatano (2005) found that impaired self-
awareness was related to treatment outcome, length of stay, treatment compliance, and 
the establishment of a working alliance in therapy (Anderson et al. 1999; Prigatano 
2005). 
The successful assessment and management of traumatically brain injured adults 
requires that the patients have insight into their own functional limitations, including how 
awareness deficits impact their activities of daily living (Prigatano, Alman & O'Brien, 
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1990). At the basic level, implementing compensatory strategies requires the patient 
initially to be aware that a problem needs to be addressed, and participation in 
remediation involves the recognition that these problem areas need to be strengthened or 
improved (Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Self-awareness requires that the patient compare 
information from an external, objective source, with the patient's own inner experience 
(O'Callaghan, Powell & Oyebode, 2006). 
Studies reported that the inability of the patient to recognize deficit areas that 
need improvement prevented the participation in even the most remedial activities 
(Toglia & Kirk, 2000), and often resulted in the patient's refusal, or even total resistance 
to treatment efforts (Hart et aI., 2004). Studies have found that patients were less likely to 
implement compensatory strategies when the need for these strategies was not apparent 
(Sherer et aI., 1998a; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). 
Studies have repeatedly demonstrated that deficits in awareness negatively 
impacted rehabilitation efforts because they significantly disrupted the patient's 
participation in rehabilitation, impeded motivation for treatment (Hart et aI., 2004; Sherer 
et aI., 1998a; Sherer et aI., 1998c; Toglia & Kirk, 2000), decreased involvement in 
therapy tasks, and reduced compliance of behavioral change suggestions (Fleming, 
Strong & Ashton, 1998). 
With unawareness comes the lack of motivation, a common sequelae following 
brain injury. Many patients lack the motivation to comply with rehabilitative treatment 
protocols (Sherer, et aI., 1998a; Anderson et aI., 1999; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Studies by 
Andersson and his colleagues (1999) reported that a major problem both in physical and 
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in neuropsychological rehabilitation following brain injury was the ability to engage 
patients in rehabilitation activities. 
In a study by Andersson et al. (1999), the authors investigated the relationship 
between patient apathy and emotional reactivity, measured by the change in 
electrodermal and cardiovascular activity during therapeutic involvement. Their findings 
concluded that reducing apathy and increasing self-awareness would promote patient 
motivation both in rehabilitation, and within the therapeutic relationship. Anderson et al. 
(1999) reported that ignoring such emotions as patient apathy could easily create 
unrealistic expectations both in the patients and in the rehabilitation staff. 
The incompatibility between a patient's unrealistic goals, family expectations, and 
goals posed by the treatment team presents additional challenges to rehabilitation 
professionals (Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Awareness and self-monitoring require the ability to 
evaluate the level of difficulty involved in a task as it relates to the person's individuals 
strengths and weaknesses, as well as an ability to plan ahead and to incorporate 
appropriate strategies (Goverover, 2004). 
Studies have found that there was a tendency for patients to choose activities 
beyond their perceived abilities, with little recognition of deficit, or the recognition that 
they required any assistance at all (Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Sherer et al. (1998b) repOlied 
that the functional outcome of treatment objectives was impeded by the patient's inability 
to choose appropriate long-term goals accurately. As a result of incompatible goals, 
patients often experienced repeated failures over time, increasing their levels of 
frustration (Prigatano, 2005). 
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In a study by Fischer, Gauggel and Trexler (2004), the authors examined the 
relationship between awareness, the ability to set realistic goals, and outcome for 
rehabilitation. Their findings demonstrated the fact that patients with less realistic 
awareness of their limitations set less realistic goals. Hence, rehabilitative outcome was 
found to be lower for these patients when compared with patients who demonstrated 
more realistic views of their impairments. Their studies concluded that self-awareness 
was related to higher goal setting ability and positive outcome in long-term rehabilitation; 
however, it was found to be less so for short-term experimental tasks. 
Studies by Goverover (2004) examined the relationship between the patient's 
executive function, self-awareness and every-day functional competence in patients who 
sustained brain injury. The study indicated that categorization, deductive reasoning 
(defined as an ability to formulate a hypothesis, make inferences and rationalize a 
conclusion), and self-awareness were good predictors of functional performance of 
activities of daily living, and could direct more appropriate planning of treatment 
interventions. 
Studies by Katz, Fleming, Keren, Lightbody and Haliman-Maeir (2002) repOlied 
that deficits in awareness should be viewed on a continuum which will differ between 
and within patients. Because patients exhibit varying degrees of this syndrome complete 
with psychological and neurological factors, occupational therapists need to evaluate the 
extent to which unawareness is present. Furthermore, the authors asserted that the 
severity of awareness impairment should guide the treatment team in selecting between 
structured awareness training versus compensatory strategies (Katz et al., 2002). 
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In a comprehensive literature review by Lucas and Fleming (2005), the authors 
outlined models to guide therapists' interventions and created key factors to consider 
while implementing these tasks. Factors included the client-therapist relationship, goal 
setting, task selection, and emotional issues. From an educative point of view, the authors 
reviewed feedback techniques, behavioral therapy techniques, individual and group 
psychotherapy, strength-and-weakness lists, and task-rating strategies. A multi-contextual 
treatment approach, as well as an occupation-based intervention program was reviewed 
(Lucas & Fleming, 2005). 
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The concept of perceived control 
The ability to comprehend the perception and attribution of control has long been 
a major goal in the field of psychology (Declerck, Boone & De Brabander, 2006). 
To date, the majority of studies addressing the phenomenon of control have provided no 
conceptual definition of control; rather, the meaning is left to the reader's understanding, 
or is given an operational definition to communicate meaning (Thompson, 1981). 
According to Thompson (1981), control is defined as "the belief that one has at 
one's disposal a response that can influence the aversiveness of an event" (p. 89). She 
further asserts that although the definition is broad enough to address different types of 
control, it also emphasizes the idea that "the control does not need to be exercised for it to 
be effective and that it does not even need to be real, just perceived for it to have effects" 
(p.89). 
Of the literature addressing control, the largest body of research focuses on 
analyzing individual differences in perceived control (Wegner & Bargh, 1998). 
Psychological disorders ranging from depression or learned helplessness, to addiction and 
psychosis are invariably accompanied by a sense of loss of control (Declerck et al., 
2006). 
Schroder et ai., (2007) examined the perception of behavioral control in patients 
with chronic idiopathic axonal polyneuropoathy. Their findings concluded that perceived 
behavioral control, in part, mediated the impairment (identified as muscle strength) and 
the patient's activity limitations. They found that the patient's impairment affected the 
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individual's perceived control, and in turn, these perceptions contributed to the patient's 
activity limitations. 
Hasson-Ohayon, Walsh, Roe, Kravetz and Weiser (2006) differentiated between 
perceived personal control (defined as control of self) and perceived interpersonal control 
(defined as control of others) on different domains of quality of life for patients with 
severe mental illnesses. Their results demonstrated the fact that personal control was 
more positively related to the achievement of personal subjective goals, than to the 
achievement of environmental and o~jective goals (Hasson-Ohayon et al. 2006). 
A sense of cognitive control has been found to have overall positive effects on the 
experience of an unpleasant event; knowing one has a cognitive strategy reduces 
anticipatory anxiety, reduces the impact of the presenting issue, and improves the 
subsequent effects (Thompson, 1981). Patients who feel a sense of control in the health 
care environment demonstrated more positive adaptive outcomes, and tended to exhibit 
more favorable emotional and behavioral responses to disease and aversive procedures 
(Tangsrud & Smith, 2000). The authors suggested that high control perception 
contributed to physical well-being through (a) avoidance of negative physiological results 
associated with control loss and (b) the increased likelihood that that patients will 
participate in appropriate health and maintenance behaviors (Tangsrud & Smith, 2000). 
Studies by Fuhrer, Rintala, Hart, Clearman and Young (1992) found that 
perceived control has the strongest association with life satisfaction. The authors asserted 
that, theoretically, the concept of perceived control may be important as a psychological 
variable that mediates the relationship between life satisfaction on the one hand and 
handicap on the other. Chase, Comille and English (2000) examined the extent to which 
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life satisfaction in patients with spinal cord injuries was linked to perceived control. 
Exploratory findings suggested that the variables of perceived control (along with marital 
status) were significant predictors of life satisfaction (English, 2000). 
In a longitudinal study, Windsor, Anstey, Butterworth, and Rogers (2008) 
investigated the relationship between negative life events in midlife and perceived 
control. The study highlighted the importance of approach-avoidance traits both in 
influencing control beliefs and in controlling the effects of stressful events on control. 
Their results indicated that the experience of negative life events was associated with 
weaker control beliefs. Additionally, a behavioral approach was positively reJated to 
control which was found to be protective against negative life events that undermine 
control beliefs. 
Vallerand, Templin, Hasenau, & Riley-Doucet (2007) reported that a patient's 
perceived control over pain was a subjective phenomenon that played an important part 
in how an individual reacted to pain. Their findings concluded that the patients' 
knowledge and attitudes about pain and symptom management affected their 
participation in and acceptance of a particular pain management program, as well as their 
adherence to therapy regimes (Vallerand et aI., 2007). 
Other studies by Haythornthwaite, Menefee, Heinberg and Clark (2000) found 
that patients' perceptions on control over pain, in addition to utilizing specific pain 
coping strategies, were positively correlated with a positive outcome in chronic pain 
conditions and in better adjustment. In a study by Vallerand et aI., (2007) it was found 
that perception of control over pain had a significant effect on pain-related distress. 
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Williams, Golding, Phillips and Towell (2004) investigated the effects of 
differences in a pre-procedure briefing related to perceived control, and preparatory 
information on the perceptions ofthe second of two identical pain situations. Their results 
concluded that differences between participant groups were related to individual locus of 
control, and that perceived control should be engendered in clinical situations in which 
painful procedures were involved (Williams et. aI., 2004). 
Studies by Jones, Mandy, and Partridge (2000) examined the effect of 
empowering stroke patients, and found that the extent to which patients perceived they 
were in control oftheir own recoveries encouraged them to contribute to their 
rehabilitation. Bollini, Walker, Hamann, & Kestler (2004) concluded that interventions to 
enhance perceptions of control and personal control expectancies served to protect 
individuals from exposure to stressful situations. 
In a study by White, Brown, Somers, and Barlow (2006) the authors examined the 
relationships among anxiety sensitivity, perceived control, and agoraphobia. Their 
findings indicated that anxiety sensitivity and perceptions of control (both threat and 
emotional control) were correlated with agoraphobia. Those individuals who perceived 
themselves to have little control over threatening situations and emotions, and who were 
fearful of the physical symptoms associated with anxiety, exhibited more phobic 
avoidance (White et aI., 2006). 
Moser et al. (2007) examined the relationship between anxiety and perceived 
control with in-hospital patients who had experienced an acute myocardial infarction. 
Findings suggested that perceived control had a moderating relationship; when they 
perceived that control was high, the association between anxiety and in-hospital 
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complications was weak. When they perceived that control was low, the association 
between anxiety and in-hospital complications was strong (Moser et al., 2007). 
In a study by Velissaris, Wilson, Saling, Newton, and Berkovic (2007), findings 
concluded that patients who experienced a fIrst-time seizure experienced threats to their 
sense of control, which, in tum, resulted in changes to their cognitive and behavioral 
processes. These included feelings of a pervasive loss both of physical and of 
psychological control as a result of exposure to vulnerability. Findings concluded that at 
one month, pervasive loss of control, as well as depression and anxiety, were associated 
with subsequent seizures (Velissaris et aI., 2007). 
The study also found that gender was most strongly related to perceived loss of 
control, and suggested that women were more vulnerable to stress following a traumatic 
event (Velissaris et aL, 2007). Additionally, the authors noted that those patients with a 
previously diagnosed psychiatric history reported a pervasive loss of control, which 
suggested that patient responses were influenced by susceptibility to stress. Pervasive loss 
of control was reported more often by older patients (Velissaris et aI., 2007). 
Studies by O'Donnell, De Soto, & De Soto (1993) suggested that those patients' 
tendencies to over report symptoms on the NIS may have been more reflective of an 
affective disturbance, or have been associated more closely with nonorganic impairment. 
Although the underreporting of symptoms on the NIS may be the result of such 
psychological and motivational factors (such as a desire to leave treatment, or the 
reluctance to admit deficits), the tendency to underreport was associated with the more 
significant, neurologically based anosognosia (Prigatano & Schacter, 1991). 
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Impaired awareness and the perception of control 
The question remains about whether or not an individual's awareness, impaired or 
not, affects his or her appraisal of how he or she is able to perceive control over the 
environment following brain injury. Restated differently, is there a relationship between 
an individual's ability to acknowledge neurological deficits and the ability to perceive 
control over one's behavior and his or her environment? Prigatano and Schater (1991) 
define the concept of self-awareness as the ability to "perceive a situation, object or 
interaction in a manner similar to others' perceptions, while at the same time maintaining 
a sense of a private, subjective, or unique interpretation of the experience." (p. 12). 
Few research studies have examined the interrelationship between impaired self-
awareness the perception of control. From a conceptual standpoint, it is easy to view 
impaired self-awareness simply as the consequence of cognitive dysfunction that 
interrupts processes of perception, memory, and a comprehension ofthe changes in 
oneself (Hart, 2005). Prigatano (1998) reported that for patients who sustained moderate 
to severe traumatic brain injury, cognitive dysfunction emerged with an overall 
disturbance of consciousness and day-to-day recall that manifested in obscuring the 
patient's self-perception and perception of external reality. 
Johnson et al. (2002) discussed the importance of a patient's ability to reflect 
consciously on one's sense of self as a significant feature of self-awareness and defines a 
sense of self as "a collection of schemata regarding one's abilities, traits and attitudes, 
that guides our behaviors, choices and social interactions; the accuracy of one's sense of 
selfwill impact ability to function effectively in the world." (p. 1808). 
PERCEIVED CONTROL AND SELF-AWARENESS 39 
Therefore the question remains, if the sense of self is impaired, rendering the 
patient unaware, can the patient accurately perceive control over the abovementioned 
abilities? The importance of determining whether or not the patient exhibits a deficit in 
awareness would reflect impairment in the ability to perceive accurately his or her ability 
to guide behavior, choices, and social interactions. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Participant Data Files 
Individuals who were identified for this pilot study were selected from existing 
archival patient data files located within a private psychological practice in 
Mechanicsburg, Peillisylvania. The patients were originally recruited by way of self-
referral, through family members, physical therapists, physiatrists, psychiatrists, 
neurologists, primary care physicians, schools, and attorneys. Each archival data file 
represented an individual patient who participated in an assessment battery with the 
intention of evaluating his or her current status of neurocognitive functioning. 
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
For purposes ofthis study, each data file consisted of demographic information 
obtained from the patient's clinical interview, as well as a compilation of his or her 
neuropsychological assessment measures and resultant diagnosis. Only patient charts that 
met the criteria for a completed neuropsychological data set were selected. The 
completed data set included two self-report independent checklists; selected 
neuropsychological measures addressing specific cognitive domains were identified. 
Those patients who did not complete both checklists, who completed only one, or who 
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did not complete the neuropsychological assessment measures identified for this study 
were excluded from selection. 
Measures 
Comprehensive Neuropsychological Assessment Battery 
Patients who met criteria for the completion of assessment measures outlined for 
this study were previously administered a neuropsychological battery addressing the 
cognitive domains of intellect, verbal and visual memory, attention and concentration, 
visuo-spatial ability, language, and executive functioning. In addition, self-report 
checklists addressing personality and emotional functioning were also administered. 
These inventories were selected, based upon the patient's presenting complaint or the 
refenal question. All patients were administered the Perceived Control Across Domains 
Scale (PCADS; Davis, Freeman & Royer, 2004) and the Neuropsychological Impairment 
Scale (l\l"IS; O'Donnell, DeSoto, DeSoto & McQ Reynolds, 1993) as a measure of their 
subjective report of symptoms. 
Perceived Control Across Domains Scale (PCADS) 
The Perceived Control Across Domains Scale (PCADS; Davis, Freeman & Royer, 
2004) was developed as an untimed, 36-item self-report scale, intended to measure the 
amount of the patient's perceived control across 17 common areas. Such domains include 
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food intake, family relationships, work and school relationships, social and close 
relationships, emotional expression, substance use, self care and health maintenance, 
activities of daily living, aggressive behavior, self-injurious behavior, finances, thought 
processes, compulsive and obsessive behaviors, mood state, future, goals, personal 
influence over his or her environment, and the perceived control of physical discomfort 
(Davis, Freeman & Royer, 2004). 
The PCADS is administered as an untimed, self-report assessment measure, 
taking approximately 15 minutes to complete. This measure, written at a seventh grade 
reading level, is composed of six factors encompassing 17 items. The total scoring ranges 
from zero to a total of 51. A cut-off score of 14 for the average college student would 
indicate that the individual is within the average range within the population for college 
students. In addition to an individual score, examination of individual item responses 
allows the clinician to identify specific areas in which the individual may feel either 
adequate or feel a loss of control across both cognitive and behavioral domains (Davis, 
Freeman & Royer, 2004). 
Psychometric Properties of the PCADS 
Test-retest reliability. Statistical analysis demonstrated the fact that items were 
reliable over time. The PCADS was administered in conjunction with the SOC-3 during 
its initial administration. During the test-retest which occurred one week later, the 
participants were administered only the PCADS. Test-retest reliability utilizing 
Spearman's rho correlation coefficient between total PCADS scores and the total PCADS 
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retest score was 1'=.898, p<'OOO, indicating strong test-retest validity. Correlations 
between individual items and the corresponding retest scores were found to be 
statistically significant for all items, with a range from .471 to 1.0 (p<.01). 
Face Validity. The items are designed to be face-valid, with each domain clearly 
identified (Le., "Goals"). Under each item the individual is able to choose which one of 
four levels, ranging from zero (almost never having problems within this area) to three 
(almost always having problems within this area) applies to him or her (Davis, Freeman 
& Royer, 2004). 
Neuropsychological Impairment Scale (NIS) 
The NIS, a self-report, paper-and-pencil inventory consisting of 50 items, is 
intended to screen and measure the patient's neuropsychological symptoms (NIS; 
O'Donnell, DeSoto & DeSoto, 1993). There is a long version and short version of the 
NIS, each designed to rate the patient's subjective complaints on a five-point scale. These 
range from zero (not at all) to four (extremely). For purposes ofthis study, the shorter, 
research edition of the N1S was administered as a screening measure of the patient's 
neuropsychological complaints and as a supplement to the clinical interview. 
The NIS is administered to adults ages 18 and older, and can be read at a fifth-
grade reading level or above. Its purpose is to be utilized as an addition to the clinical 
intake, or to supplement a comprehensive psychological or neuropsychological 
assessment battery (O'Donnell et al., 1994). Development and the standardization of the 
NIS is based upon the earlier research and deVelopment of the Cognitive Deficit Scale of 
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the Symptom Checklist 90-Revised (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1977) which led to the initial 
and subsequent versions of the NIS (Leark, 1994). The most recent version of the NIS 
was developed, based upon a group of patients who were cognitively impaired, post-
acute, and participating in cognitive rehabilitation. The nonclinical standardization 
sample (N = 1,000) obtained was grouped demographically according to race, gender and 
age, based upon the 1995 US Bureau of Census (Leark, 1994). 
Psychometric Properties o/the NIS 
Reliability. Split half, internal consistency Cronbach alpha coefficients and test-
retest reliability were used to assess reliability. For the neuropsychiatric sample, a 
coefficient of .93 was found when correcting for attenuation (Leark, 1994). For 
nonclinical samples, Cronbach alpha internal consistency coefficient values for each 
scale range from .66 to .95. For the clinical sample, the values range from .67 to .97. 
Median values for the scales are .79 for the nonclinical group and .86 for the clinical 
group (Leark, 1994). 
Test-retest reliability. Test-retest reliability was achieved by utilizing four 
different subject groups: Group 1 (college-age subjects) with an average correlation of 
.90 (ranging from .64 to .98); Group 2 (neuropsychiatric outpatients) yielded an average 
coefficient of .91 (ranging from .78 to .94); Group 3 (neurological patients) from which 
reliability coefficients were not reported, and Group 4 (outpatient rehabilitation 
participants) which averaged .83 (ranging from .72 to .88). The patients were 
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administered the NIS on two separate occasions, with a time interval of approximately 
two weeks between each administration. 
Construct validity. Construct validity assessed the scale correlations and factor 
structure of the NIS, and was examined with respect to its intemal structure, as well as its 
convergence with measures asserted to measure constructs of similar areas. The factor 
structure compares both clinical and nonclinical standardization samples, with 
relationship pattems found to be similar for both groups (Leark, 1994). 
Criterion validity. Criterion validity was measured by looking at convergent 
measures, screening ability and discriminant analysis. Findings concluded that the NIS is 
sensitive to cognitive impairments. The NIS's screening effectiveness, encompassing hit 
rate, sensitivity and specificity compared the GMI (Global Measure of Impairment) 
scores (2:70) with Halstead Reitan Battery Impairment Indexes (2: .5). Given this criteria, 
a .80 hit rate, a sensitivity of .91 and a specificity of .76 was achieved. The classification 
table outlining the discriminant analysis yielded an overall 90% accurate classification 
(Leark, 1994). 
Cognitive Measures 
In addition to the two measures of subjective self-report, a comprehensive 
neuropsychological assessment battery had been administered in order to address the 
following domains of neurocognitive functioning. 
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Measures of Intellect 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Third Edition (WAIS-III, Wechsler, 1997). 
The W AIS-III provides Verbal (subtests include Information, Vocabulary, Similarities, 
Comprehension, Arithmetic and Digit Span), Performance (subtests include Picture 
Completion, Block Design, Matrix Reasoning, Picture Arrangement, Digit Symbol and 
Object Assembly) and Full Scale IQ measures. Factor Scores include Verbal 
Comprehension, Perceptual Organization, Working Memory and Processing Speed. 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999). The WASI 
is designed as a reliable, brief measure of general cognitive ability (Hebben & Milberg, 
2002). The W ASI provides a Verbal IQ score (subtests of Vocabulary and Similarities), a 
Performance IQ score (Block Design and Matrix Reasoning) and a Full Scale IQ score. 
Because both intelligence measures were selected and administered, depending 
upon referral question and presenting symptoms, only the Verbal, Performance and Full 
Scale IQ scores will be utilized as a measure of intellectual ability. 
Measures of Attention 
Symbol Digit Modalities Test (SDMT; Smith, 1991). The SDMT is a task 
requiring visual scanning and tracking under time demands (90 seconds). The examinee 
is required to match specific numbers to specific geometric figures, utilizing a reference 
key as a guide (Hebben & Milberg, 2002). The measure is administered in written and 
oral format, and has a cut-off time demand of90 seconds. 
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Digit Span (DS; Wechsler, 1987; Wechsler, 1997). The Digit Span subtest is a 
task of short-term auditory sequential memory. The Digit Span subtest is one of the 
subtests both of the WAIS-III and of the WMS-R. Numbers are read aloud to the 
examinee who is required to repeat the sequence of digits back to the examiner in the 
order presented. The amount of repeated numbers increases as the task progresses. The 
task is also administered in a reverse format, during which the examinee is required to 
recite numbers of progressively increasing length in a backwards format when presented 
in a forward order by the examiner. Forward digit span is a measure of elementary 
attention or span of apprehension; backward digit span is the ability to manipulate 
information mentally, and requires the additional component of working memory 
(Hebben & Milberg, 2002). 
Trail Making Tests (TMT; Reitan & Wolfson, 1993). Trails A and B are a 
measure of sustained visual attention, visual scanning, sequencing and cognitive 
flexibility (Hebben & Milberg, 2002). The first task, Trails A requires the examinee to 
scan a page and to connect the numbers in numerical sequence accurately, under a time 
demand. The second task, Trails B, requires the examinee to differentiate between two 
types of symbols (both numbers and letters), and to alternate from one set of symbols to 
the other consistently (maintaining attention on two aspects of stimulus situation). This 
task is also a measure of executive ability. 
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Measures of Executive Function 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Heaton, et aI., 1981). The WCST is a 
measure of the examinee's ability to demonstrate concept formation and abstract 
reasoning involving flexible problem-solving, the capacity to learn from experience, and 
perseverative responding. 
Category Test (CT; Reitan & Woflson, 1993). For purposes ofthis study the 
booklet version of the Category Test was administered by the examiner. The task 
measures complex concept formation encompassing the ability to note reoccurring 
similarities and differences in stimulus material, postulate reasonable hypotheses about 
the similarities and differences, test hypotheses by receiving positive or negative 
feedback, and to adapt hypotheses based upon the reinforcement following each 
response. This is also a measure of abstraction, reasoning and logical analysis essential 
for organized planning. For purposes of this study, individuals were administered either 
the WCST, CT or both, depending upon referral questions and levels of education. 
Measures of Verbal Memory Function 
Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised (WMS-R; Wechsler, 1987). Both verbal and 
visual memory tasks were administered. As a measure of verbal memory, the subtest of 
Logical Memory I requires the examinee to listen and encode paragraph-length 
information which consists of a few short sentences read aloud, and then to recall the 
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story to the examiner immediately after it is read. A second story of different content is 
also read aloud, and the examinee again, is required to encode and recall the infOlmation 
presented orally. Logical Memory II is a measure of verbal retention; the examinee is 
required to recall both passages after a 30-minute delay. This task yields a score for 
verbal encoding, recall and retention. 
Hopkins Verbal Learning Test-Revised (HVLT-R; Brandt & Benedict, 1991). 
The HVLT-R is a word-list learning and memory task which consists of a list of 12 
nouns, with four items taken from each of three semantic categories (Brand & Benedict, 
1991). The task yields a score oftotal number of words encoded over three trials. A 20-
25 minute delay yields a recall and recognition score. 
Measures of Visual Mem01Y Function 
Wechsler Mem01Y Scale-Revised (WMS-R; Wechsler, 1987). As a measure of 
visual memory, the subtest of Visual Reproduction I requires the examinee to examine 
and encode four stimulus cards presented one at a time for a brief la-second exposure. 
The examinee is then required to reproduce each card following exposure of the card. 
Visual Reproduction II is a measure of visual retention; the examinee is required to 
reproduce the four cards from memory after a 30-minute delay. This task yields a score 
for visual encoding, recall and retention. 
Rey Complex Figure Test and Recognition Trial (RCFT; Meyers & Meyers, 
1995). The RCFT incorporates four trials consisting of a Copy trial, immediate recall 
(administered at a three minute delay) of the figure, a delayed recall (administered after 
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30 minutes) and a recognition trial administered directly after the 30-minute delay. The 
task measures visuospatial recall and recognition memory, processing speed and visuo-
constructional skill (Hebben & Milberg, 2002). The components of the three-minute 
delay, 30-minute delay, and recognition trial were used as a measure of visual memory. 
Measures of Language Function 
Controlled Oral Word Association Test (COWAT; Benton & Hamsher, 1989). 
The COW AT is a task that measures the examinee's ability to produce individual words 
which belongs to a particular class identified by a letter (Hebben & Milberg, 2002). The 
task requires the individual to generate as many words as possible within a one-minute 
interval. Two forms are used; one utilizes the letters ofF, A, and S; the second form 
utilizes the letters C, P, and L. As a measure of categorical and semantic fluency, the 
examinee is required to generate as many words as possible that belong to a particular 
category under a one-minute time demand. For this data, the category of Animals was 
utilized. The COW A T is also a measure of executive ability. 
Measures of Spatial and Constructional Skills 
Judgment of Line Orientation (JOLO; Benton, et al., 1994). The JOLO is a 
measure of spatial perception, orientation and visual-spatial judgment. The examinee is 
required to identify and match angled lines to a stimulus card which details a multi-
number radii arranged in a semicircle (Hebben & Milberg, 2002). 
PERCEIVED CONTROL AND SELF-AWARENESS 51 
Rey Complex Figure Test and Recognition Trial (RCFT; Meyers & Meyers, 
1995). The copy trial was utilized as a measure of complex visuospatial and 
constructional skills. The delay components of the RCFT included a three-minute delay, a 
30-minute delay, and a recognition trial; these were used as a measure of visual memOlY 
for the study. 
Measures of Emotional and Personality Functioning 
Because the presenting concerns and referral question dictated the measure of emotional 
functioning to be utilized, the following self-report checklists were administered to 
exammees: 
Beck Depression Inventmy--II (BDI; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996). The BDI is a 
face-valid, self-report inventory consisting of21 statements which identify common 
symptoms of depression and severity of symptoms (Hebben & Milberg, 2002). 
Beck Anxiety Inventmy (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1993). The BAI is a face-valid, self-
report inventory consisting of21 statements which identify common symptoms of 
anxiety and their level of severity (Hebben & Milberg, 2002). 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventmy-2 (MMPI-2; Butcher, Dahlstrom, 
Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989). The MMPI-2 is a broad-range personality 
inventOlY comprising 567 true-false statements. The measure is intended to screen for 
psychopathology and assess the major symptoms of social and personal maladaptive 
behaviors in individuals age 18 and older (Hebben & Milberg, 2002). 
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Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory--III (MCMI-III , second edition; Million, 
Davis & Million, 1997). The MCMI-III is a broad-range 175 item inventory assessing 
personality and Axis I disorders, in individuals 18 and older. The test is designed to 
assess the patient's long-term personality characteristics and his or her interaction with 
the patient's presenting clinical symptoms (Millon, Davis & Millon, 1997). 
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Procedures 
Data collection 
Data utilized for this study was collected from identified archival patient files that 
had been assessed at a private practice during a period of four years. Each data file met 
the criteria for the complete neuropsychological assessment battery identified for this 
study. A letter of permission from the Clinical Director allowed the researcher access to 
patient files, including demographic information and a summary of the completed 
assessment data. For purposes of inter-rater reliability, the facility's Clinical Director 
reviewed each patient's chart to ensure that each individual met the criteria for the 
complete data set identified for the research study. 
A summary sheet located in each archived patient file outlined raw scores, T-
scores and percentile ranks for each neuropsychological measure and checklist, and was 
photocopied by a staff assistant who worked within the facility. For ease of comparison, 
only T -scores were entered for statistical analyses. All data was entered by the 
researcher. 
All identifiable information such as the patient's name, date of birth, referral 
source, and occupation were blacked out from the photocopied page for each file. 
Unidentifiable demographic information including presenting complaint, age, 
education, gender, and diagnosis was entered into a statistical program for data analysis. 
Each summary sheet was assigned a subject number before data was entered to ensure 
confidentiality. 
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For those patient files which had two sets of assessment scores (test-retest), only 
the initial set of data from the first assessment was utilized for this study. All archival 
patient charts were returned to their original file cabinet after use. All charts were 
secured in order to ensure confidentiality of all patient data and assessment materials. 
The assessment process for archival data Jiles 
For each archived data file, a clinical interview had been previously conducted by 
a licensed psychologist, who determined the assessment measures that would be 
appropriate to address the patient's presenting complaints and referral questions. 
Following the clinical interview, a doctoral-level psychology intern administered the 
neuropsychological assessment battery as outlined by the supervising psychologist. 
At the onset of the test administration, patients routinely and independently filled 
out two standardized self-report measures. These allowed them to identify and evaluate 
the severity of neuropsychological symptoms, as well as to self-appraise their 
perceptions of overall functioning across several domains of daily living. 
Following the completion of these checklists, a comprehensive 
neuropsychological assessment was administered to appraise cognitive domains. These 
included an evaluation of intellect, attention and concentration, executive functioning, 
visual and verbal memory, memory retention, visual-spatial ability and language, as 
well as selected emotional and functional self-report checklists. 
Following completion of the assessment, all protocol scoring was completed by a 
doctoral-level intern and outlined on a summary sheet. The final scores were reviewed 
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by the licensed psychologist who determined the patient's diagnosis and outlined 
treatment recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
A total ofN 85 participant files selected (in chronological order) from archival 
data were identified for this study. The demographic breakdown for the study follows 
below. 
Demographics 
A total of 44 males represented 51.8 percent of the data. A total of 41 females 
represented 48.2 percent of the data files. Selected participants ranged in age from 18 
years to 71 years. The mean age was 45.2 with a standard deviation of 8.6. The mean 
education for the data set was 14.83 with a standard deviation of 3.00. The minimum 
level of education in years was 8 years. The maximum level of education for the data set 
was 22 years. 
Participant files (n = 25) that contained the WAIS-III assessment measure yielded 
a mean Full Scale IQ score of 105.7 with a standard deviation of 15.5. The minimum Full 
Scale IQ was 80; the maximum Full Scale IQ was 136. Participant files (n = 58) that 
contained the WASI assessment measure yielded a mean IQ score 105.9 with a standard 
deviation of 15.1. . The minimum Full Scale IQ was 65; the maximum Full Scale IQ was 
128. 
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Presenting Complaints 
Approximately one-third of patient data files selected presented with complaints 
of different severity levels of traumatic brain injury. Table 1 outlines the breakdown of 
patient complaints at the time of the referraL 
Table 1 
Frequency Distribution of Patient Presenting Complaints 
Presenting Complaint Number % 
_ ..... _ ...... _ ..... _ ................ 
Traumatic Brain Injury 33 38.8 
Acquired Brain Injury 21 24.7 
Memory/Dementia 14 16.5 
Developmental 12 14.1 
Psychiatric 5 5.9 
.. - ...... - ..... --...... ~ 
Total 85 100 
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Diagnoses 
Following a neuropsychological evaluation, approximately one-third of patient 
data files that were identified met the criteria for traumatic brain injury. Table 2 outlines 
the breakdown of patient diagnoses (derived from the neuropsychological report). 
Table 2 
Frequency Distribution of Patient Diagnoses 
Presenting Complaint Number % 
Traumatic Brain Injury 30 35.3 
Acquired Brain Injury 10 11.8 
Memory/Dementia 22 25.9 
Developmental 14 16.5 
Psychiatric 9 10.6 
Total 85 100 
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Hypotheses and Findings 
In assessing a patient's ability to report symptoms accurately (as measured by the 
Neuropsychological Impairment Scale), as they relate to domains of neurological 
impairment (as measured by neuropsychological tests) and the ability to accurately 
evaluate accurately how well there is (sense of) control over (behavior and) environment 
(as measured by the Perceived Control Across Domains Scale), the following hypotheses 
were outlined. 
Because of multiple comparisons, a Bonferroni Correction was run to guard 
against inflation of the experiment-wise alpha (aln, where n denotes the number 
(maximum number) of comparisons; for this study, 15). Thus, .05 alpha divided by 15 = 
0.003 or (rounded to) 0.01. Thus, the alpha level was set at .01 as a threshold for 
significance. 
Hypothesis # 1 
Lower scores on self-report of neurological impairment (as measured by the 
Neuropsychological Impairment Scale) will be associated with higher levels of global 
cognitive ability as measured by standardized assessment. An ANOV A addressed the 
relationship between the NIS total score and cognitive assessment measures of Trails A 
(F = .311), (and) Trails B (F = .678). A Pearson Product Moment Correlation addressed 
perseverative responses on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (r = .038), Symbol Digit 
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Modalities Test Oral (r = -.128) and Written (r = .170), and Full Scale IQ (r = .030). No 
significant relationship was found between these variables,p > .01. 
Hypothesis # 2 
Higher scores on self-report of neurological impairment (as measured by the 
Neuropsychological Impairment Scale) are associated with greater memory impairment. 
A Pearson correlation addressed the relationship between the total NIS score and 
memory subtests of the WMS-R: both Verbal Retention (r = .071), and Visual 
Retention (r = -.069), and recall scores of the RCFT: both three-minute (r = -.180) and 
thirty-minute (r= -.089) delay tasks. No significant relationship was found between 
these variables, p > .01. 
Hypothesis # 3 
Higher scores on self-report of neurological impairment (as measured by the 
Neuropsychological Impairment Scale) are associated with greater language 
impairment. A Pearson correlation addressed the relationship between the NIS total 
score and verbal memory subtests of the HVLT-R: Retention (r = -.059) and Recall(r = 
-.145) tasks and scores on the verbal tasks of the COWAT (1' = -.094) and Semantic 
Fluency (r = -.057). No significant relationship was found between these variables, p > 
.01. 
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Hypothesis # 4 
Higher scores on self-report of neurological impairment (as measured by the 
Neuropsychological Impairment Scale) are associated with greater visual spatial and 
constructional impairment. A Pearson correlation addressed the relationship between 
the NIS total score and spatial tasks consisting of the RCFT Copy task (r = -.057), 
Judgment of Line Orientation (r = -.017) and the WASI Performance IQ score (r = 
.062). No significant relationship was found between these variables,p > .01. 
Hypothesis # 5 
Intellectual functioning moderates self-report symptoms of neurological 
impairment and overall global cognitive ability. A Partial Correlation was performed for 
the number of perseveratory responses on the WSCT (r = .0082), Symbol Digit 
Modalities Test: Written (r = -.0503) and Oral (r = -.0700) while controlling for WASI 
Full Scale IQ scores. All were found to be non-significant (p > .01). 
Hypothesis # 6 
Lower scores on self-report on domains of perceived control (as measured by the 
Perceived Control Across Domains Scale) will be associated with higher levels of 
global cognitive ability as measured by standardized assessment. An ANOVA 
addressed the relationship between the PCADS total score and cognitive assessment 
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measures of Trails A (F = .311), Trails B (F .678). A Pearson correlation addressed 
perseverative responses on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (r =.-.142), Symbol Digit 
Modalities Test Oral (r = -.046) and Written (r .058), and Full Scale IQ (r = .083). No 
significant relationship was found between these variables,p > .01. 
Hypothesis # 7 
Higher scores of self-report on domains of perceived control (as measured by the 
Perceived Control Across Domains Scale) are associated with greater memory 
impairment. A Pearson correlation addressed the relationship between the PCADS total 
score and memory subtests of the WMS-R: both Verbal Retention (r = .099), and Visual 
Retention (1' = -.033), and recall scores of the RCFT: both three-minute (1' = -.080) and 
thirty-minute (r = -.082) delay tasks. No significant relationship was found between 
these variables,p > .01. 
Hypothesis # 8 
Higher scores on self-report on domains of perceived control (as measured by the 
Perceived Control Across Domains Scale) are associated with greater language 
impairment. A Pearson correlation addressed the relationship between the PCADS total 
score and verbal memory subtests of the HVLT-R: Retention (r = -.001) and Recall 
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(1' = -.076) tasks, and scores on the verbal tasks of the COWAT (1' -.067) and 
Semantic Fluency (1' -.018). No significant relationship was found between these 
variables, p > .01. 
Hypothesis # 9 
Higher scores on self-report on domains of perceived control (as measured by the 
Perceived Control Across Domains Scale) are associated with greater visual spatial and 
constructional impairment. A Pearson correlation addressed the relationship between 
the PCADS total score and spatial tasks consisting ofthe RCFT Copy task (1' -.141), 
Judgment of Line Orientation (1' -.025), and the WASI Performance IQ score (1' -
.001). No significant relationship was found between these variables, p > .01. 
Hypothesis # 10 
Intellectual functioning moderates self-report symptoms of perceived control and 
overall global cognitive ability. A Partial Correlation was performed for the number of 
perseveratory responses on the WSCT (1' = -.0277), Symbol Digit Modalities Test: 
Written (1' = -.0350) and Oral (1' -.0456) while controlling for WASI Full Scale IQ 
scores. All were found to be non-significant (p> .01). 
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Hypothesis # 11 
There is an association between higher scores of self-report on the Neurological 
Impairment Scale and higher scores on the Perceived Control Across Domains Scale, 
indicating that patients would accurately perceive themselves as having little personal 
control over their lives, concurrently with brain injury. A One-Way ANOV A indicated 
no significance between total scores of the PCADS and NIS (F= .183,p > .01). The 
two scales were positively correlated (r = .635,p < .01). 




This study examined a sample of patients from archival data files, who previously 
presented with brain diseases and disorders of varying magnitudes of impainnent. Each 
patient had been referred to a clinical practice for an evaluation of his or her 
neuropsychological functioning. A total of 85 patient files were selected, based upon a 
completed data set for the study. 
Patients were divided according to presenting complaints and final diagnoses. The 
first group was composed of individuals who had sustained traumatic brain injuries as 
results of being involved in a motor vehicle accident, pedestrian accidents, falls resulting 
in head injury, and mild, to moderate and severe TBI. The second group was composed 
of patients who were referred for vague neurological complaints and neurocognitive 
difficulties including seizure disorders, anoxic events, aphasia, tumors and cerebral 
vascular accidents. 
The memory and dementia group were referred for general and vague memory 
concerns and complaints, patients who had multiple sclerosis, and cognitive complaints 
because of possible dementia due to significant and previous alcohol abuse. Those adults, 
who were categorized as having problems associated with developmental concerns, 
reported problems with attention, concentration and focus, or had a prior diagnosis of 
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attention disorders or disorders within the autistic spectrum. The remaining patients were 
those who presented with psychiatric complaints, including Bipolar, Schizophrenia 
(medication managed), anxiety and depression. 
The purpose of the study was to explore whether or not a relationship would be 
found between the patients' self-reports of perceived control (as measured by the 
Perceived Control Across Domains [PCADS]), and their self-appraisals of 
neuropsychological symptom severity (as measured by the Neuropsychological 
Impairment Scale [NISJ), when compared with their actual assessment scores following 
brain injury. 
The author was interested in investigating the relationship between patients' 
subjective self-reports as predictors of neuropsychological functioning. Findings 
concluded the patients' self-appraisals on measures of self-report of neurological 
symptoms and levels of severity, as well as the patients' perceptions of control over 
behaviors and their environments, did not allow the predictions of patient performances 
on standardized assessment measures. No consistency was found on checklists scores and 
test performances within groups. Although some patients achieved better scores than they 
expected, despite their self-reports to the contrary, others achieved poorer results when 
compared with their own standardized assessment scores. 
Total scores from the patients' self-endorsed checklists were compared with their 
actual test scores across several cognitive areas of neuropsychological functioning, 
including memory and attention, executive ability, and visual spatial constructional 
abilities. From a statistical standpoint, because of multiple comparisons, a Bonfenoni 
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Conection was run to in order to guard against the inflation of the experiment-wise alpha; 
hence the alpha level was set at .01 as a threshold for significance. 
Hypotheses Findings 
The first hypothesis investigated whether or not lower scores (indicating that the 
patient reported little to no impairment) on a self-report measure of neurological 
impairment (as measured by the NIS), would be associated with higher levels of overall 
cognitive ability. An ANOVA was performed to compare the patients' assessment scores 
on Trails A, Trails B. A conelational analysis was performed on the number of 
perseverative responses on WCST, and the SDMT (both written and oral).The results 
found no significant relationship between the patients' self-reports of little to no 
impairment in neurological symptoms as predictors of higher levels of overall global 
cognitive impairment. 
The second hypothesis investigated whether or not higher scores on the NIS 
(indicating the patient reported greater levels of neurological symptom severity) would be 
correlated with greater memory impairment. A Pearson Correlation was performed to 
compare patients' self-reports with assessment scores as measured by the visual and 
verbal memory retention scores of the WMS-R, and the 3-minute, and 30-minute recall 
scores of the RCFT. The results found no significant relationship between patients' 
reports of greater neurological difficulties as predictors of greater memory impairment. 
The third hypothesis investigated whether or not higher scores on the NIS 
(indicating greater levels of neurological symptom severity) would be associated with 
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greater impairment in language. A Pearson Correlation was performed to compare 
patients' self-reports with assessment scores retention and recall tasks of the HVLT-R, 
and the scores on the COW AT, F AS and semantic fluency tasks. No significant 
relationship was found between patients' self-reports of greater neurological difficulties 
as predictors of greater language impairment. 
The fourth hypothesis addressed the relationship between patients' higher scores 
on self-reports of neurological impairment, and whether or not their reports of greater 
impairment would be associated with greater impairment on tasks measuring visual 
spatial and constructional ability. A Pearson Correlation was performed to compare 
patients' subjective reports of greater impairment, and the RCFT copy task, lOLO, and 
the Performance IQ scores on intellectual measures. Results found no significant 
relationship between patients' self-reports of greater neurological impairment as 
predictors of greater impairment in visual spatial and constructional ability. 
The fifth hypothesis examined patients' overall self-reports of neurological 
impairment and the relationship to overall global cognitive ability when controlling for 
education. A Partial Correlation was performed while controlling for IQ. Results 
indicated that the patients' responses were not moderated by IQ when partialed-out. 
The sixth hypothesis investigated whether or not lower scores (indicating that 
patients' perceived themselves to have more control) on the PCADS would be associated 
with higher levels of global cognitive ability when compared with standardized 
assessment scores. An ANOVA was performed to compare the patients' assessment 
scores on Trails A, Trails B. A correlation was performed on the number of perseverative 
responses on WCST and on the SDMT (both written and oral).Our results found no 
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significant relationship between the patients' self-reports of little to no control over their 
environments as predictors of higher levels of overall global cognitive impairment. 
The seventh hypothesis investigated whether or not higher scores on the PCADS 
(indicating that patients felt less control over their behavior and environment) were 
associated with greater memory impairment. A Pearson Correlation was performed to 
compare patients' self-reports of the amount of control that was perceived with 
assessment scores, as measured by the visual and verbal memory retention scores of the 
WMS-R, and the 3-minute, and 30-minute recall scores ofthe RCFT. The results found 
no significant relationship between patients' reports of minimal to no control reports as 
predictors of greater memory impairment. 
The eighth hypothesis investigated the relationship between higher scores on the 
PCADS and greater language impairment. A Pearson Correlation was performed to 
compare patients' self-reports with assessment scores retention and recall tasks of the 
HVLT-R, and the scores on the COW AT, F AS and semantic fluency tasks. No significant 
relationship was found between patients' self-reports of little to no control as predictors 
of greater language impairment. 
1be ninth hypothesis investigated whether or not a relationship would be found 
between higher scores on the PCADS and greater impairments in visual spatial and 
constructional abilities. A Pearson Correlation was performed to compare patients' 
subjective reports of greater impairment, and the RCFT copy task, JOLO, and the 
Performance IQ score on intellectual measures. Results found no significant relationship 
between patients' self-reports of minimal to any control as predictors of greater 
impairment in visual spatial and constructional abilities. 
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The tenth hypothesis addressed whether or not intellectual functioning moderated 
self-report symptoms and global cognitive abilities. Partial conelations were 
accomplished to determine the relationship between for the PSV total on the WCST, the 
SDMT (Written and Oral) and the NIS total scores when controlling for IQ. All were 
non-significant (p > .01). 
The eleventh and final hypothesis investigated whether or not the difference in 
self-reports addressing the domains of perceived control would differ, based upon gender, 
age or diagnosis. No significant differences were found, based upon these findings. 
Limitations of the study 
Because this was an exploratory study utilizing existing data, the most obvious 
limitation to the study was the sample size. We were not able to achieve sufficient 
statistical power. A larger number of subjects may have contributed to a larger statistical 
power; however, not all patient charts met the completed data set when selected for the 
study. This was due predominantly to the individualized assessment protocol designed 
according to patient complaint and age; therefore, some measures were not utilized. 
Additionally, it should be noted that the correlations were found to be extremely 
low. Had adequate power been achieved, the correlations may have been statistically 
significant, but not clinically significant (for example, r .20 would account for 
approximately 4% of the sample). 
Another limitation was the heterogeneity of the sample. Diagnostic categories 
representing the patients' presenting complaints and final diagnoses were representative 
PERCEIVED CONTROL AND SELF-AWARENESS 71 
of that which one would expect to find in a clinical practice. However, there was 
considerable heterogeneity within each category. Additionally, not all disorder were 
represented equally within each category. For example, some clients were involved in 
litigation involving lawsuits related to job injuries. Studies report that malingering is an 
important factor of concern for patients involved in personal injury litigation, or other 
scenarios in which benefits for compensation or disability are awarded (Nicholson & 
Martelli, 2007). For this reason, generalizability of results would also a factor. 
Different ethnicities were not identified in the study. This was due predominantly 
to the use of existing data, on which ethnic demographics were not noted on the 
assessment protocols. 
Implications for research in the fie ld of psychology 
Although the findings of this study were reported as not being significant, some 
implications for the future research in the field were noted. First, the representative 
sample clientele examined for this study is a more representative group of the kind of 
patients that many neuropsychologists might encounter in private practice, unless there is 
a specialization of a particular disorder or disease. 
The study did not find an expected discrepancy in scores as a predictor of the 
patient's perception of cognitive impairment. Rather, the study found that patients did not 
reliably predict their own level of cognitive impairment on self-report measures. This was 
surprising, given the literature on the assessment of patients with deficits following 
neurological insult. Research indicates that the most conventional manner in which to 
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measure patient awareness of self is through the comparison of the patient's self-report 
with standardized neuropsychological measures (Flashman & McAllister, 2002; Fleming 
et al., 1996; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Findings concluded that patients with deficits in 
awareness tend to rate their abilities as better than the standard, and the discrepancy 
between the self-perception of abilities and actual scores is said to be the measure of the 
level of unawareness (Hart et al., 2004; Sherer, et al., 1998b). 
More studies utilizing the PCADS in different sample populations would be 
beneficial. There is also the possibility that the construct of perceived control in assessing 
a patient's level of impairment may be minimally associated or completely unrelated. 
Also, the question arises about whether or not the presence of severe cognitive 
impairment is or is not related to how intensely a patient is able to perceive a sense 
control over behaviors and personal enviromnents. Studies by Thompson on perceived 
control (1981) emphasized the fact that control needs only to be perceived in order to be 
effective. Given these patients' inability to predict their own levels of impairment 
reliably, this fact may not hold true for patients with neurological insult. 
Toglia and Kirk (2000) described metacognitive knowledge as declarative 
knowledge concerning one's own abilities. Disruption of these functions have been found 
to interrupt the ability to appraise one's abilities accurately, including the ability to obtain 
a sense of control over his/her behaviors and the environment Therefore, it is also 
possible that the PCADS would be more appropriately utilized as a more sensitive 
evaluative measure for complex metacognitive processes. This might include such 
higher-level metacognitive functions as the ability to self-appraise one's feelings about 
one's own behaviors and across domains of everyday living. 
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The need for accurate psychological assessment is imperative, given the 
importance of evaluating not only the patient's level of functioning, but also the patient's 
perception of his or her ability to control and manage the environment. This discrepancy 
between a patient's perception of his or her behaviors, abilities and management of the 
environment compared with his or her actual ability has been seen, for example, in 
individual who have been referred for neuropsychological assessment to return to work or 
resume driving activities. 
With the rising cost of insurance, companies have encouraged modified 
assessment protocols which focus on a minimal number of assessment measures, relying 
heavily on clinical interviews. The use of structured interviews relies heavily on the 
patients' abilities to comprehend questions verbally, and to convey their understanding of 
their deficits verbally (Flashman & McAllister, 2002). Given the findings of this study, if 
patients are unable to report symptoms reliably, or to perceive their levels of control over 
daily functions unreliably, the question remains about how clinicians can reliably 
diagnose them. The need for structured self-report measures and a robust 
neuropsychological battery accessing domains of cognitive abilities is imperative for the 
accurate assessment, diagnosis, identification of functional limitations and 
recommendations for rehabilitation and treatment. 
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy 
Although no relationship was found for the NIS and the PCADS to predict scores 
on cognitive measures, both checklists could easily be utilized within the assessment 
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setting to assist not only with reporting neurological symptom severity, but also with 
reporting the patients' thoughts about the amount of security they feel in controlling their 
environments following neurological insult. Within the assessment setting, not only 
would the checklists provide additional information to supplement the clinical interview, 
but also give a subjective overview to supplement patient complaint not otherwise 
mentioned or questioned by the clinician. 
Research suggests that impaired self-awareness was related to treatment 
outcome, length of stay, treatment compliance, and the establishment ofa working 
alliance in therapy (Anderson et al. 1999; Prigatano 2005). Sherer and his colleagues 
(1998b) reported that the functional outcomes of treatment objectives were impeded by 
the patient's inability to choose appropriate long-term goals accurately because of deficits 
in awareness. As a result of incompatible goals, patients often experience repeated 
failures over time which increases their level of frustration (Prigatano, 2005). 
Within the therapeutic arena, the establishment of a strong therapeutic alliance 
during psychotherapy could be established more quickly when patients have the chance 
to fill out checklists that address subjective experience and complaint This would also 
provide a segue into conversation about such thoughts that may not readily be apparent 
during the first few sessions. 
In both cases, the infonnation gamered from these checklists would assist in 
creating effective treatment plans that are specific to the problematic domains reported by 
the patient. Beyond the treatment plan, both checklists could be utilized for periodic 
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reevaluation in order to determine whether or not patients were making progress over 
time, both in their subjective evaluations of symptom reports, and in the perceptions of 
their regained control over their environments. 
Future Directions 
The current study examined some of the issues involved in this type of 
exploratory study within a clinical practice. It would be beneficial to design a study that 
would incorporate a larger sample size. Further, it may be more advantageous to study 
one group at a time, in which patients were equally represented across groups. This, in 
turn, this would promote more effective generalizability. Additionally, because 
demographics for age, gender and education were incorporated, more cross-cultural 
studies are needed; therefore, it would be beneficial to observe different ethnic groups 
within the various groups of patients who sustain neurological insult. 
PERCEIVED CONTROL AND SELF-AWARENESS 76 
PCADS 
(Perceived Control Across Domains Scale) 
Copyright, 2004, Beth Arbum Davis 
Instructions for completing tlte Perceived Control Across Domains Scale: After 
carefully reading each group of statements, circle the response (0,1,2, or 3) that best 
describes the way you feel. 
1. Activities of daily living: 
o - I almost never have problems doing things for myself such as eating, 
dressing, or bathing. 
1 - I sometimes have problems doing things for myself such as eating, 
dressing, or bathing. 
2 - I often have problems doing everyday activities for myself such as eating, 
dressing, or bathing. 
3 - I almost always have problems doing everyday activities for myself such 
as eating, dressing, or bathing. 










I am always careful about my health. 
I am often careful about my health. 
I sometimes am careful about my health. 
I am never careful about my health. 
I almost never have problems achieving my goals. 
I sometimes have problems achieving my goals. 
I often have problems achieving my goals. 
I almost always have problems achieving my goals. 
4. Food intake: 
o - I never have problems with the amount of food I eat. 
1 - I often have problems with the amount of food I eat. 
2 - I sometimes have problems with the amount of food I eat. 
3 - I almost always have problems with the amount of food I eat. 
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5. Substance use: 
o - I never have problems with drug or alcohol use. 
1 - I sometimes have problems with drug or alcohol use. 
2 - I often have problems drug or alcohol use. 
3 - I almost always have problems with drug or alcohol use. 
6. Thought processes: 
0- I almost always change the way I think, if doing so would help me. 
1 - I often change the way I think, if doing so would help me. 
2 - I sometimes change the way I think, if doing so would help me. 
3 - I never change the way I think, even if doing so would help me. 
7. Aggressive behavior: 
o - I never think of myself as aggressive. 
1 - I sometimes think of myself as aggressive. 
2 - I often think of myself as aggressive. 






I always think of myself as optimistic. 
I often think of myself as optimistic. 
I sometimes think of myself as optimistic. 
I almost never think of myself as optimistic. 
9. Emotional expression: 
0- I never have problems like yelling or throwing things when I'm angry or 
frustrated. 
1 - I sometimes have problems like yelling or throwing things when I'm 
angry or frustrated. 
2 - I often have problems like yelling or throwing things when I'm angry 
or frustrated. 
3 - I almost always have problems like yelling or throwing things when I'm 
angry or frustrated. 
10. Family relationships: 
0- I never have problems with family relationships. 
1 - I sometimes have problems with family relationships. 
2 - I often have problems with family relationships. 
3 - I almost always have problems with family relationships. 
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11. Impulsive behavior: 
o - I never have thoughts, images, or impulses that I can't put a stop to. 
I - I sometimes have thoughts, images, or impulses that I can't put a stop to. 
2 - I often have thoughts, images, or impUlses that I can't put a stop to. 
3 - I almost always have thoughts, images, or impulses that I can't put a stop 
to. 
12. Worlilschool relationships: 
o - I almost never have problems with people at work or school. 
I - I sometimes have problems with people at work or school. 
2 - I often have problems with people at work or school. 
3 - I almost always have problems with people at work or school. 
13. My environment: 
o I almost always think I am able to influence people around me. 
I - I often think I am able to influence people around me. 
2 - I sometimes think I am able to influence people around me. 
3 - I never think I am able to influence people around me. 
14. Self-injurious behavior: 
0- I never have problems with wanting to harm myself. 
I - I sometimes have problems with wanting to harm myself. 
2 - I often have problems with wanting to harm myself. 
3 - I almost always have problems with wanting to harm myself 
15. Social relationships: 
0- I almost never have problems with people when I'm in a social situation. 
1 - I sometimes have problems with people when I'm in a social situation. 
2 I often have problems with people when I'm in a social situation. 
3 I almost always have problems with people when I'm in a social situation. 
16. Physical sensations: 
o - I always am able to relieve physical discomfOli when I have it. 
1 I often am able to relieve physical discomfort when I have it. 
2 - I sometimes am able to relieve physical discomfort when I have it. 
3 - I rarely am able to relieve physical discomfort when I have it. 
17. Finances: 
0- I never have problems with spending too much money. 
1 I sometimes have problems with spending too much money. 
2 - I often have problems with spending too much money. 
3 I almost always have problems with spending too much money. 
Name: Date: 
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N.I.S. 
Below is a list of problems which some people have. Some of them describe their 
experiences during the past few days or weeks. Others refer to their life-time experiences. 
Please read each one carefully and ask yourself how much that statements applies to you. 
Then, to the left of that statement, circle the number that shows how much the statement 
applies to you, from "Not At All" to "Extremely." Answer every item to the best of your 
ability. Do not spend a great deal of time on anyone item. 
Responses: 0 Not at all; 1 = A little bit; 2 = Moderately; 3 Quite a bit; 
4 Extremely. 
I 0 1 2 3 4 1. I am forgetful. 
0 1 2 3 4 2. I bump into things. 
0 1 2 3 4 3. I get tired easily. 
0 1 2 3 4 4. My mind works slowly. 
0 1 2 3 4 5. My hearing has become worse. 
0 123 4 6. I have trouble writing sentences. 
0 1 2 3 4 7. I often feel sad and blue. 
0 1 2 3 4 8. My words get mixed up. 
0 1 2 3 4 9. I have trouble following conversations. 
0 1 2 3 4 10. I like everyone I kno 
0 1 2 3 4 11. I check and double check everything I do. 
.. _ .. _ ... 
.0 1 2 3 4 12. I faint sometimes. 
0 1 2 3 4 13. Part of my body is paralyzed. 
0 1 2 3 4 14. I drop things frequently. 
0 1 2 3 4 15. I have serious memory problems. 
0 1 2 3 4 16. I have trouble walking. 
0 1 2 3 4 17. I feel quite discouraged about my future. 
0 1 2 3 4 18. My eyesight has become worse. 
3 4 19. I have trouble getting organized. 
3 4 20. I am always right. 
!o 1 2 3 4 21. I forget what I'm saying. 
0 1 2 3 4 23. My thinking becomes blocked. 
! 
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0 1 2 3 4 24. I fall down sometimes. 
0 1 2 3 4 25. I have forgotten many things which happened in my 
childhood. 
0 1 2 3 4 26. My hands shake and tremble. 
0 1 2 3 4 27. I tend to worry all the time. 
0 1 2 3 4 28. My muscles twitch and jump. 
0 1 2 3 4 29. I am very clumsy. 
0 1 2 3 4 30. I am always happy. 
0 1 2 3 4 31. I have trouble with the left side of my body. 
0 1 2 3 4 32. I have trouble learning new things. 
0 1 2 3 4 33. I get confused easily. 
0 1 2 3 4 34. I often lose things. 
0 1 2 3 4 35. I have forgotten much of what I have learned in school. 
0 1 2 3 4 36. My mind frequently goes blank. 
0 1 2 3 4 37. I think about death and dying often. 
0 1 2 3 4 38. My health is getting worse. 
0 1 2 3 4 39. I have difficulty making decisions. 
0 1 2 3 4 40. I always do the right thing. 
0 1 2 3 4 41. My speech has become worse. 
0 1 2 3 4 42. I feel frustrated quite often. 
0 1 2 3 4 43. I have trouble spelling. 
0 1 2 3 4 44. I have a hard time remembering people's names. 
0 1 2 3 4 45. I have been knocked unconscious. 
0 1 2 3 4 46. Part of my body feels numb. 
0 1 2 3 4 47. I often feel lonely and isolated. 
0 1 2 3 4 48. I have had a head injury. 
0 1 2 3 4 49. My handwriting has become worse. 
0 1 2 3 4 50. I always tell the truth. 
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